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Preemption’s Rise (and Bit of a Fall) as 
Products Liability Reform  
WYETH, RIEGEL, ALTRIA, AND THE RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD)’S PRESCRIPTION PRODUCT DESIGN 
DEFECT STANDARD 
Richard L. Cupp Jr.† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On the whole, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability1 represents a fundamentally restrictive view of products 
liability. It both reflects and has encouraged an era of contraction in the 
courts following the explosive growth of products liability doctrine and 
litigation in the 1960s and 1970s. This Article analyzes prescription 
product designs as illustrative of an area in which the Restatement 
(Third) took an especially restrictive stance. The Article considers the 
Restatement (Third)’s standard for prescription products, particularly its 
standard for prescription product design defect claims, in light of the 
preemption doctrine’s rising strength over the past two decades, as well 
as its recent limitation in 2009. 
The Restatement’s prescription product design standard, set forth 
in section 6(c), has proved to be one of the project’s more controversial 
aspects.2 In section 6(c) the Restatement took the position that, with 
regard to design defect claims, a prescription product manufacturer may 
not be liable unless no reasonable health care provider would have 
prescribed the product to any class of persons.3 
In a 1994 article I criticized this approach as a “near-immunity 
standard,” and I noted that it lacked foundation in case law while 
  
 †  John W. Wade Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. I thank 
Jennifer Allison and Michael Floryan for their outstanding research assistance, and I thank 
Pepperdine University School of Law for supporting my work on this Article with a research grant. I 
am also thankful to Anita Bernstein and Aaron Twerski for inviting me to participate in this 
symposium, and to Mike Green for providing feedback regarding some of the ideas addressed in this 
Article. Responsibility for any mistakes in the Article is of course mine alone. 
 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998). 
 2 See infra Part II. 
 3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(c) (1998). 
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expressing doubts about whether it would serve public policy interests.4 
Others also voiced these criticisms,5 but the drafters defended their 
position6 and included the standard in their 1997 final version of the 
Restatement.7  
In 1999, I participated in a symposium in which I reviewed case 
law and scholarly commentary that had developed since my 1994 article 
and section 6(c)’s formal adoption in 1997. In an article written for the 
symposium I noted that both courts and scholars were mostly critical of 
the Restatement’s approach; its near-immunity standard was not catching 
on with judges or with the academic community.8 It was broadly 
perceived as too pro-manufacturer and not sufficiently protective of 
consumers, in addition to being inconsistent with case law.9 
This Article compares and contrasts the rocky (on the whole) 
reception section 6(c)’s restrictive prescription product design standard 
has received with the rise of an increasingly active judicial approach to 
preemption from the 1990s through the late 2000s, which may have to 
some extent crested (at least for now) with Riegel v. Medtronic10 in 2008, 
and which showed signs of possible contraction (again, at least for now) 
with Wyeth v. Levine11 in 2009. In particular, this Article analyzes 
preemption’s overall effect of developing a generally more restrictive 
approach to prescription product design defect claims, along with other 
prescription product defect claims. Part II begins by setting the stage for 
the Restatement (Third)’s development as a fundamentally restrictive 
approach to products liability. It fleshes out section 6(c)’s standard of 
allowing liability for prescription product design defect only if no 
reasonable health care provider would prescribe it to any class of 
patients, and it explains why this “near-immunity” standard (which is my 
  
 4 Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for Prescription Drugs: 
The Restatement (Third) Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 76, 99-
110 (1994). 
 5 See, e.g., George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1089 (2000) (published after the Restatement was 
completed but reflecting some of the criticisms voiced during the drafting process); Teresa Moran 
Schwartz, Prescription Products and the Proposed Restatement (Third), 61 TENN. L. REV. 1357, 
1363 (1994) (criticizing the Restatement’s proposed prescription product design defect standard). 
 6 See, e.g., James Henderson, Jr., Prescription Drug Design Liability under the 
Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Reporter’s Perspective, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 471, 151-52 
(1996). 
 7 The drafters of the Restatement (Third) continued participating in debate regarding this 
issue well after the final version of the Restatement (Third) was published. See, e.g., James A. 
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, 111 YALE L.J. 151 (2001) 
(defending the Restatement (Third)’s prescription product design defect standard). 
 8 Richard L. Cupp, Jr., The Continuing Search for Proper Perspective: Whose 
Reasonableness Should Be at Issue in a Prescription Product Design Defect Analysis?, 30 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 233, 244-52 (1999) (citing and discussing cases and law review articles addressing the 
Restatement (Third)’s prescription product design defect standard); see also infra notes 27-28 and 
accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
 10  128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). 
 11  129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
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description, not the Reporters’) is one of the most restrictive specific 
aspects of the generally restrictive Restatement project.  
This Part also briefly addresses cases that have cited section 6. It 
notes that the number of cases addressing section 6 is relatively small. 
Further, a surprisingly large percentage of these cases addresses design 
defect claims, despite broad agreement that warning defect claims are 
much more common in cases involving prescription products. The Part 
addresses some potential reasons for this. It concludes by explaining that, 
whatever the reasons, few would likely describe the Restatement’s near-
immunity standard for prescription product design defect claims as a 
smashing success with courts and commentators. 
Part III focuses on the two cases argued before the Supreme 
Court in 2008 addressing prescription product preemption: Riegel and 
Wyeth (which, though argued before the Supreme Court in 2008, was 
decided in 2009). It also briefly discusses a third major preemption case 
heard by the Supreme Court in 2008 involving a products liability-related 
claim, albeit one involving cigarette labeling rather than prescription 
products—Altria Group, Inc. v. Good.12 The Part begins by providing a 
brief background on the rise of preemption since Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc.,13 which was decided in 1992 at around the time formal work 
on the Restatement (Third) was beginning. It then analyzes Riegel, the 
2008 Supreme Court case that preempted lawsuits for defects in 
prescription medical devices that have been subjected to premarket FDA 
approval under the Medical Device Amendments Act of 1976.  
Although Riegel is analyzed in some depth, Justice Scalia’s 
discussion in the majority decision directed toward perceived 
shortcomings in the American tort system merits particular 
consideration. In his decision, Justice Scalia demonstrates both 
skepticism regarding the civil jury system and what may be a 
fundamental misunderstanding of aspects of products liability law. This 
aspect of the Riegel decision—which was more recently repeated by the 
dissenters in Wyeth—is especially powerful in demonstrating that even 
when courts are using the language of preemption doctrine, they may to 
some extent be seeking to reform products liability litigation.  
As further evidence of broader policy concerns about litigation 
involving prescription products exerting influence on preemption’s rise, 
Part III next addresses the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)’s 
shift in position during the George W. Bush administration regarding 
whether FDA approval should create preemption. It also explores the 
backlash against this policy shift from FDA career officials, President 
Bush’s political opponents, from Justice Ginsberg in her Riegel dissent, 
and from the majority in Wyeth. 
  
 12 129 S. Ct. 538, 541 (2008). 
 13 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
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Part III then analyzes Wyeth, the even more heralded prescription 
product preemption case considered by the Supreme Court in 2008 and 
decided in 2009.14 Wyeth addressed whether implied preemption should 
apply broadly to cases involving warnings for FDA-approved products, 
and concluded that preemption should be limited in this context.15 This 
Part considers the Vermont Supreme Court’s approach to the issues, 
intense political wrangling related to the case prior to its being heard by 
the United States Supreme Court, reactions to oral arguments before the 
Supreme Court, and the Court’s decision. 
Part III concludes with a brief analysis of Altria, the 2008 
Supreme Court case in which the Court narrowly decided to continue the 
approach of finding that state fraud-related cigarette labeling claims are 
not a requirement related to smoking and health, and thus are not 
preempted by federal law. Altria’s flirtation with extending preemption 
to fraud-related claims in cigarette litigation—the dissent came within 
only one vote of succeeding in this position—provides further evidence 
of pressure within the Court to expand the doctrine beyond its previous 
limits. 
Finally, Part IV concludes by suggesting that the restrictive tone 
of section 6(c) may have to some extent caught the “mood” of courts 
regarding prescription product design liability, even if the specific details 
of the unfamiliar standard have not found much traction. Cases such as 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,16 decided near the time formal 
work on the Restatement (Third) began, reflect the Supreme Court’s 
increased willingness to craft decisions that would have the effect of 
significantly restricting products liability law. Preemption’s rise in 
products liability cases began in earnest just a year earlier in Cipollone 
and continued at least through Riegel in 2008. Whether Wyeth represents 
an end to the trend or a significant bump in its road remains to be seen.  
Both Riegel and Wyeth involved prescription products, which 
corresponds with increasing political and judicial concern regarding 
whether prescription products liability is too expansive. Even though not 
all of the preemption cases since Cipollone have resulted in restrictions 
on products liability claims, on the whole they have narrowed the reach 
of products liability in prescription product design cases, as well as in 
other types of prescription product cases.  
Indeed, some of the rationales provided for section 6(c) overlap 
with some of the rationales the Supreme Court employed in the 1990s 
and most of the 2000s to support its increasingly aggressive use of 
preemption analysis in prescription products cases. Thus, Part IV 
concludes that the currents underlying section 6(c)’s restrictive tone for 
prescription product design liability may have found a “back door” in 
  
 14 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187. 
 15  Id. at 1203-04. 
 16 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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Supreme Court rulings such as Daubert and Riegel, despite most courts’ 
and commentators’ refusal to provide “front door” acceptance of the 
Restatement (Third)’s prescription product design defect standard.  
II.  THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON PRESCRIPTION PRODUCTS 
On the whole, defendants and their friends have been happier 
with the Restatement (Third) than have plaintiffs and their friends. The 
document was, and remains, a product of its time. Following years of 
explosive doctrinal expansion in the 1960s and 1970s,17 products liability 
doctrine began a gradual contraction through the 1980s. The contraction 
manifested itself in widespread legislative restrictions,18 in reported 
judicial decisions, and in jurors’ reactions to products liability lawsuits.19 
It also increasingly manifested itself in critical scholarly analysis.20 
Professors James Henderson and Aaron Twerski were prominent leaders 
in this scholarly trend toward questioning products liability’s 
expansiveness.21 When they took up the mantle as the Products Liability 
  
 17 See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 466 (2006) (describing reforms implemented during this period of “plaintiff-
oriented liberalization” of U.S. tort law). 
 18 See id. at 470-80 (describing the influence of the American Tort Reform Association, 
whose goal was to reform tort laws to make them more favorable to defendants, on federal and state 
legislative tort reform processes in the 1980s). 
 19 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution 
in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731, 733-35 (1992) (providing a more expansive analysis of 
the empirical data related to products liability cases of the late 1980s in furtherance of the conclusion 
that products liability jurisprudence during this time tended to favor defendants); Marc Galanter, 
News From Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENVER U. L. REV. 77, 94-95 
(1993) (citing and describing the results of multiple studies of tort cases in state in federal courts that 
“depict a sustained contraction of product liability exposure” during the late 1980s); James A. 
Henderson, Jr., & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical 
Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 481 (1990) (presenting an analysis of empirical data 
related to products liability judicial decisions from the 1960s to the 1980s, which supports the 
authors’ theory that “changes in judicial decision making are occurring and that current trends favor 
defendants”). 
 20 For example, when the New Jersey Supreme Court in Beshada v. Johns-Mansville 
Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 546 (N.J. 1982) imputed knowledge of a risk in a warnings case 
without requiring evidence that the risk was known or should have been known, within two years six 
law review articles were published criticizing the case as an inappropriate expansion of liability. See 
Robert D. Casale, Comment, Beshada v. Johns Manville Products Corp.: Adding Uncertainty to 
Injury, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 982, 984 (1983); William R. Murray, Jr., Comment, Requiring 
Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically Undiscoverable Product Defects, 71 GEO. L. REV. 
1635, 1637 (1983); Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risk: The Case Against Comment k and for 
Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 855-56 (1983); Victor Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to 
Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 892, 893 & 
n.9 (1983); Robert D. Towey, Note, Products Liability—Strict Liability in Tort-State-of-the-Art 
Defense Inapplicable in Design Defect Cases—Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 13 
SETON HALL L. REV. 625, 635 (1983); John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of 
Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 738 (1983). These articles were 
cited in 1984 by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, a case 
criticizing aspects of Beshada and limiting its expansive imputed knowledge holding to asbestos 
cases. Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 387-88 (N.J. 1984).  
 21 See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American 
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 
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Restatement’s Reporters in the early 1990s, few could be surprised that 
their concerns about expansive liability were reflected in their work on 
the project. 
The Restatement’s position on prescription product design 
liability is one of the most restrictive sections of the project. Found in 
section 6(c), the standard allows liability for drug and prescription devise 
designs only if no reasonable prescription health care provider knowing 
the therapeutic risks and benefits would prescribe them to any class of 
patients.22 Specifically: 
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to defective 
design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device are 
sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that 
reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and 
therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any 
class of patients.23 
The Reporters understood that their approach was quite 
restrictive. Only in rare circumstances would a prescription product 
design be so bad that it would be unreasonable for a health care provider 
to prescribe it to any class of patients. Comment f to section 6(c) calls it a 
“very demanding” standard and says that under this rule “liability is 
likely to be imposed only under unusual circumstances.”24 
In addition to addressing design defect claims, section 6 also sets 
forth liability standards for prescription products warnings defect 
claims25 and manufacturing defect claims.26 Manufacturing defect claims 
  
1267 (1991) (arguing against ruling for the plaintiff in a products liability case if the product is not 
defective); James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices: 
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1531 (1973) (maintaining that judicial bodies 
are ill-equipped to develop appropriate product design standards to determine reasonableness 
standards in products liability cases, at the expense of providing a fair trial for defendant product 
manufacturers); James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for Defective Product Design: A 
Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C. L. REV. 625, 626 (1978) (decrying the practice of using a 
reasonableness standard in design defect product liability cases); Aaron D. Twerski, A Moderate and 
Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 575, 580 (1985) (arguing for the creation of uniform nationwide legal standards to 
ensure that defendant manufacturers are not subject to unfair products liability litigation). 
 22 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(c) (1998). 
 23 Id.  
 24 Id. § 6(c) cmt. f. 
 25 Id. § 6(d). The Restatement’s standard for prescription product warning defect cases is 
as follows: 
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to inadequate 
instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks 
of harm are not provided to: 
(1)  prescribing and other health-care providers who are in a position to reduce the risks 
of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings; or 
(2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that health-care 
providers will not be in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the 
instructions or warnings. 
Id. 
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comprise only a small percentage of cases involving prescription 
products, and the Restatement’s liability standard for such claims has 
been uncontroversial. The largest category of product liability claims 
relating to prescription products involves alleged warnings defects; 
however, as with manufacturing defect claims, the Restatement’s 
approach to prescription product warning defect claims has been fairly 
uncontroversial. 
The Restatement’s prescription product design defect standard 
has been by far the most disputed aspect of its approach to prescription 
drugs and medical devices. Numerous law review articles, many of them 
critical, have focused on this design standard.27 The Restatement’s 
approach to prescription product designs may be described as a near-
immunity standard, because manufacturers would rarely produce a drug 
or prescription device that would not provide a net benefit to at least 
some patients, even if its overall harm is far greater than its overall 
benefits for patients as a whole.28 Some support for a near-immunity 
interpretation of section 6(c) may be found in Professors Henderson and 
Twerski’s pre-Restatement scholarship. In 1992 they published an article 
outlining what they would like to see in a Products Liability Restatement 
before the project began.29 In the article they argued that prescription 
  
 26 Id. § 6(b)(1) (incorporating the general manufacturing defect set forth in section 2(a)).  
 27 See, e.g., Andrew Barrett, Note, The Past and Future of Comment k: Section (4)(b)(4) 
of the Tentative Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts—Is It the Beginning of a New Era for 
Prescription Drugs?, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1291, 1324 (1994); Kelley E. Cash, Note, The New 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Is It the Cure for the AIDS Vaccine Ailment?, 16 REV. LITIG. 413, 
428-37 (1997); George W. Conk, The True Test: Alternative Safer Designs for Drugs and Medical 
Devices in a Patent-Constrained Market, 49 UCLA L. REV. 737, 738-39 (2002); Richard L. Cupp 
Jr., Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for Prescription Drugs: The Restatement (Third) 
Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 76, 80 (1994); Dustin R. 
Marlowe, Note, A Dose of Reality for Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability, 39 GA. L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2005); Jerry J. Phillips, The Unreasonably Unsafe Product 
and Strict Liability, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 129, 130 (1996); Angela C. Rushton, Comment, Design 
Defects Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Reassessment of Strict Liability and the Goals of 
a Functional Approach, 45 EMORY L.J. 389, 419, 435-36 (1996); Teresa Moran Schwartz, 
Prescription-Products and the Proposed Restatement (Third), 61 TENN. L. REV. 1357, 1382 (1994); 
Mark D. Shifton, Note, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability—The ALI’s Cure for 
Prescription Drug Design Liability, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2343, 2344 (2002); David S. Torborg, 
Comment, Design Defect Liability and Prescription Drugs: Who’s in Charge?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 
633, 644 (1998); Dolly M. Trompeter, Comment, Sex, Drugs, and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 
Section 6(c): Why Comment e is the Answer to the Woman Question, 48 AM U. L. REV. 1139, 1141-
42 (1999); Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a Roof Before the Foundation Is Prepared: The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. MICH. J.L. 
Reform 261, 270 (1997); Michael J. Wagner & Laura L. Peterson, The New Restatement (Third) of 
Torts—Shelter from the Product Liability Storm for Pharmaceutical Companies and Medical Device 
Manufacturers?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225, 225 (1998); Jeffrey D. Winchester, Note, Section 8(c) 
of the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Is It Really What the Doctor Ordered?, 82 CORNELL 
L. REV. 644, 647-48 (1997). 
 28 Cupp, supra note 4, at 99 (criticizing the Restatement’s approach as a “[n]ear-
[i]mmunity standard”). 
 29 James A. Henderson, Jr., & Aaron Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512 (1992). 
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product designs should have complete immunity from tort liability.30 
Although the reasonable physician approach they eventually developed 
in section 6(c) does not provide absolute immunity for prescription 
product designs, it is not far off from the Reporters’ original ideal of 
simply disallowing all liability in such cases. 
In comment d to section 6(c) the Reporters note that design 
claims involving prescription products “[have] been the subject of 
appellate review in relatively few cases.”31 Although asserting that 
prescription product warning defect cases outnumber prescription 
product design cases is hardly controversial, since the Restatement’s 
adoption, a surprising percentage of the cases addressing section 6 have 
focused on design defect claims—not just warnings. Most of these 
design defect claims have involved prescription medical devices rather 
than drugs. 
Specifically, by the end of 2007, the Restatement’s case citations 
list reported thirty-six decisions citing section 6.32 Fifteen of those thirty-
six cases—approximately forty-two percent—are cited as involving 
design defect claims.33 Further, of the fifteen cases cited as involving 
design defect claims, ten of the cases—two-thirds of the total—involved 
prescription medical devices rather than prescription drugs.34 One might 
  
 30 Id. at 1536. For a summary of Professors Henderson’s and Twerski’s argument and an 
alternative approach they suggested, see Cupp, supra note 4, at 96 n.126. 
 31 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(c) cmt. d, Reporters’ Notes 
(1998).  
 32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB., CASE CITATIONS TO THE 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (Supp. 2008) (citing cases from July 1984 through November 2007). 
Although the Restatement’s citation search technically goes back to 1984, the earliest case it cites 
addressing section 6 is from 1994, when the Restatement was a work in progress. Tansy v. Dacomed 
Corp., 890 P.2d 881, 892-94 (Okla. 1994). 
 33 The cases cited as involving design defect claims include: Anderson v. Siemens Corp., 
335 F.3d 466, 468, 470, 471 (5th Cir. 2003) (prescription device design defect claim); Transue v. 
Aesthetech Corp., 341 F.3d 911, 919 (9th Cir. 2002) (prescription device design defect claim citing 
section 6(c)); Madsen v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1034, 1037 (E.D. Mo. 2007) 
(prescription drug design defect claim and warning defect claim citing section 6(c) and (d)); Gerber 
v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d 907, 922 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (prescription drug design 
defect claim citing section 6(c)); Parkinson v. Guidant Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 741, 747-48 (W.D. Pa. 
2004) (prescription device design, warning, and manufacturing defect claims); Sita v. Danek Med., 
Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 245, 256, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (prescription device design defect claim citing 
section 6(c)); Wheat v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 46 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (prescription 
device design defect claim; section 6(c) cited); Gebhardt v. Mentor Corp., 191 F.R.D. 180, 185 (D. 
Ariz. 1999), aff’d, 15 F. App’x. 540 (9th Cir. 2001) (prescription device design defect claim citing 
section 6(c)); Bryant v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 727-28, 731, 733-34 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2003) (prescription drug design defect claim; citing section 6(c)); Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare 
Corp., 764 N.E.2d 35, 46 (Ill. 2002) (prescription device design defect claim); Mele v. Howmedia, 
Inc., 808 N.E.2d 1026, 1038-39 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (prescription device design defect claim citing 
section 6(c)); Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 835, 837-40 (Neb. 2000) 
(warning, design, and manufacturing defect claims and misrepresentation claim; citing section 6(c)); 
Parker v. St. Vincent Hosp., 919 P.2d 1104, 1111 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (prescription device design 
defect claim); Militrano v. Lederle Labs., 769 N.Y.S.2d 839, 851 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003), aff’d, 810 
N.Y.S.2d 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (prescription drug design defect claim citing section 6(c)); 
Tansy, 890 P.2d at 892-94 (prescription device design defect claim). 
 34 The decisions involving prescription medical devices rather than prescription drugs are 
all of the cases cited above in note 33 except for Freeman, 618 N.W.2d 827 (acne medication), 
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suspect that a possible explanation for these surprising statistics might be 
found in the common practice of warning and design claims being 
pleaded concurrently. If such were the case, the cases might have 
remained largely focused on warnings issues even though design defect 
claims were also technically pleaded. However, many of the cases may 
not bear out this possibility. Of the fifteen cited cases involving design 
defect claims, only three are cited by the Restatement as specifically 
addressing warning defect claims in addition to design defect claims.35 
Another factor to consider relates to the more solid grounding of the 
Restatement’s warning defect standard in existing case law than is the 
case with its design defect standard. Given that the Restatement’s 
warning standard is not particularly controversial or groundbreaking, 
courts may have less reason or inclination to cite or discuss it compared 
to the new and controversial design defect standard. 
The prevalence of design cases involving prescription devices 
rather than prescription drugs is particularly interesting. I have argued 
previously that prescription device cases are different from prescription 
drug cases, and that arguments for design defect liability are stronger for 
devices than for drugs.36 In 1994, when the Restatement project was still 
in progress, I noted that prescription devices “generally offer the same 
universe of design options as do nonmedical devices”37 and that “[t]he 
argument that FDA approval eliminates the need for design liability is 
especially faulty as applied to medical devices.”38 In a 1999 article I 
wrote that “[p]roviding prescription medical devices the same near-
immunity given to drugs under the reasonable physician standard is an 
especially troubling aspect of the Restatement (Third)’s approach.”39  
The reasons for this concern remain relevant with the passage of 
time. My strongest concern about applying a near-immunity standard to 
prescription devices was, and remains, that, unlike many drugs, they 
often provide “a broad universe of design alternatives.”40 In some ways 
prescription medical devices are more like nonmedical devices than they 
are like prescription drugs and vaccines. A lot of design alternatives are 
available to manufacturers of all-terrain vehicles, just as a lot of design 
alternatives are available to manufacturers of pacemakers. In contrast, 
although drug manufacturers sometimes make what may be accurately 
described as design decisions, often their choices are limited. Because 
more conscious choices are involved in producing devices than in 
  
Madsen, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (diet drugs), Gerber, 392 F. Supp. 2d 907 (acne medication), Bryant, 
585 S.E.2d 723 (heart medication), and Militrano, 769 N.Y.S.2d 839 (vaccine).  
 35 Those three cases are Freeman, 618 N.W.2d at 835, 837-40, Madsen, 477 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1034, 1037, and Parkinson, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 747-48. 
 36 Cupp, supra note 8, at 256.  
 37 Cupp, supra note 4, at 94. 
 38 Id. at 105. 
 39 Cupp, supra note 8, at 256 (alteration to original). 
 40 Id. 
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producing many drugs, design liability will be a genuine issue in more 
device cases than drug cases.  
Further, the scrutiny applied by the FDA to prescription devices 
is different from the FDA scrutiny applied to prescription drugs; in many 
cases the FDA scrutiny of prescription devices is less stringent.41 Also, 
prescription medical devices are proliferating,42 and, as demonstrated by 
the 2008 Supreme Court decision in Riegel v. Medtronic,43 design defect 
liability claims involving prescription medical devices have become an 
increasingly important part of the products liability landscape.  
Whatever the reasons, few would likely describe the 
Restatement’s near-immunity standard for prescription drugs and devices 
as a smashing success with courts and commentators. Although the 
approach has some supporters, most of the law review articles that have 
addressed the standard are critical.44 Courts have often bypassed the 
standard, frequently continuing to cite the Restatement (Second)’s 
section 402A while ignoring the Restatement (Third)’s approach to 
prescription products.45 The strongest support for section 6(c)’s anti-
liability impulse, if not its explicit standard, would be indirect, and would 
come from the Supreme Court’s application of the trump card of 
constitutional law in the form of preemption doctrine. 
III. PREEMPTION’S RISE IN DRUG LITIGATION: RIEGEL AND WYETH 
As noted recently by Professor Catherine Sharkey, “[p]reemption 
is the fiercest battle in products liability litigation today.”46 As fate would 
have it, the Supreme Court provided its “watershed” case that thrust 
preemption into the foreground of products liability in 1992 at about the 
same time that the Products Liability Restatement was getting 
underway.47 In that year the Court decided Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 
Inc., a case that analyzed whether the Public Health Cigarette Smoking 
Act of 1969 expressly preempted failure to warn tort claims.48 The Act’s 
language that formed the basis of the Court’s express preemption 
analysis was that “[n]o requirement or prohibition . . . shall be imposed 
  
 41 See Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1391-95. 
 42 The Bleeding Edge, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2008, at 74 (discussing how 
technological advances and an aging population encourage increased innovation in the medical 
device technology industry and create heightened public demand for new devices).  
 43 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). For a discussion of Riegel, see infra Part III.A. 
 44 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 45 According to prominent plaintiffs’ lawyer Paul D. Rheingold, between 2003 and 2008 
some 200 cases discuss section 402A, while only “a handful” discuss section 6. Paul D. Rheingold, 
Remarks at the Brooklyn Law Review Symposium: The Products Liability Restatement (Nov. 13, 
2008) (transcript on file with author).  
 46 Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 450 (2008). 
 47 Id. at 459 (describing Cippolone v. Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), as “a 
watershed case in products liability preemption jurisprudence”). 
 48 Cippolone, 505 U.S. at 508.  
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under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any 
cigarettes.”49 The Court ruled fairly broadly, holding that this preemption 
language applies to common law tort warning defect claims as well as to 
state statutes and regulations.50  
Despite the significance of the Cipollone decision and other 
cases to tobacco litigation and to other areas of products liability 
litigation where some federal regulation existed, the American Law 
Institute more or less punted on addressing preemption in the Products 
Liability Restatement. In comment a to section 6, the Reporters assumed 
the issue under the rug as follows: 
The rules imposing liability on a manufacturer for inadequate warning or 
defective design of prescription drugs and medical devices assume that the 
federal regulatory standard has not preempted the imposition of tort liability 
under state law. When such preemption is found, liability cannot attach if the 
manufacturer has complied with the applicable federal standard. See §4, 
Comment e.51 
The Court provided another major products liability preemption 
decision in 1996, shortly before the Products Liability Restatement was 
completed. In Medtronic Inc., v. Lohr, the Court addressed express 
preemption in the context of the Medical Device Act.52 In Lohr, the 
plaintiff claimed that a pacemaker made by defendant had both design 
and manufacturing defects that injured the plaintiff.53 The Court split on 
the question of whether the plaintiff’s claims were preempted by the 
FDA, and the plurality decision authored by Justice Stevens seemed to 
retreat from Cipollone’s stance that express preemption language 
addressing “requirements” applies equally to common law tort claims as 
well as it does to state statutes and regulations.54 
Following Lohr, the Court continued analyzing preemption in 
products liability cases on a fairly regular basis. For example, in 2000 the 
Court held that an airbag defect claim was impliedly preempted by the 
  
 49 Id. at 515 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)).  
 50 Id. at 524-31; see also Sharkey, supra note 46, at 460. 
 51 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b (1998). The comment went 
on to briefly note: 
The doctrine of preemption based on the supremacy of federal law should be 
distinguished from the proposition that compliance with statutory and regulatory 
standards satisfies the state’s requirements for product safety. Subsections (c) and (d) 
recognize common-law causes of action for defective drug design and for failure to 
provide reasonable instructions or warnings, even though the manufacturer complied with 
governmental standards. For the rules governing compliance with governmental 
standards generally, see § 4(b). 
Id. 
 52 518 U.S. 470, 474 (1996). 
 53 Id. at 481; see also Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption: Products 
Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1121 (2007). 
 54 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 501-02; see also Davis, supra note 53, at 1121; Sharkey, supra 
note 46, at 466. 
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National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.55 In 2001 the 
Court used implied preemption to negate a lawsuit against a device 
manufacturer’s regulatory consultant.56 In 2002 the Court declined to find 
express or implied preemption by the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 
for tort claims against a boat manufacturer for failing to equip the boat 
with propeller guards.57 And in 2005, the Court declined to apply 
preemption under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act to farmers’ claims that a pesticide manufactured by defendant 
damaged their crops.58 However, despite the importance of these 
decisions, early 2008 through early 2009 may be remembered as the 
most significant period thus far for products liability preemption 
analysis. In that twelve month span the Court decided no fewer than 
three major preemption cases involving products liability. 
A. Riegel v. Medtronic—Cutting Back on Liability for Prescription 
Medical Devices 
Although preemption is presently the fiercest battle in products 
liability generally, two of the three products liability preemption cases 
that the Supreme Court decided between early 2008 and early 2009 made 
the issue particularly heated in prescription product litigation. The first of 
these cases, Riegel v. Medtronic,59 was a prescription product preemption 
case that generated broad interest among lawyers, products liability 
scholars, and the media.  
Riegel addressed whether the Medical Device Amendments Act 
of 1976 (“MDA”) preempts products liability lawsuits for defects in 
prescription devices covered under the Act.60 Increasingly “complex 
[medical] devices proliferated” in the 1960s and 1970s,61 a trend that has 
continued to the present and that seems likely only to become stronger in 
the future as medical science progresses. The enactment of the MDA in 
1976 was propelled by “[a] series of high-profile medical device failures 
that caused extensive injuries and loss of life.”62 The best known of these 
failures involved the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, which was 
designed to provide birth control.63 Between 1970 and 1974, over two 
million women in the United States used the Dalkon Shield.64 By the 
middle of 1975 numerous deaths and miscarriages had been attributed to 
  
 55 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884-86 (2000). 
 56 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353 (2001). 
 57 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 68-70 (2002). 
 58 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 434-36, 444 (2005). 
 59 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). 
 60 Id. at 1002. 
 61 Id. at 1003. 
 62 Id. at 1014 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 63 Id. at 1014-15. 
 64 Id. at 1014-15. 
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the device, and “by early 1976 [over] 500 lawsuits . . . had been filed.”65 
The lawsuits sought more than $400 million in compensatory and 
punitive damages.66 Eventually the “manufacturer . . . settled or litigated 
approximately 7,700 Dalkon Shield cases.”67 
In response to public concern generated by situations such as the 
Dalkon Shield fiasco, the MDA created differing levels of oversight for 
medical devices based on the devices’ risks.68 “Class III” devices receive 
the greatest degree of scrutiny, requiring premarket approval unless they 
are “substantially equivalent” to existing devices.69 Premarket approval is 
a “rigorous” process.70 Currently, it is only required for a small 
percentage of devices placed on the market because most devices are 
considered substantially equivalent to existing devices. For example, in 
2005 only about one percent—thirty-two out of 3,148 devices—entering 
the market had been subjected to the premarket approval process.71 
In Riegel, the plaintiff Charles Riegel suffered from a “diseased 
and heavily calcified coronary artery.”72 The plaintiff’s doctor surgically 
implanted an Evergreen Balloon Catheter manufactured by Medtronic 
into the plaintiff’s artery to dilate it even though the device’s label 
warned against using it for calcified stenoses.73 The doctor also inflated 
the catheter more than the instructions allowed.74 The fifth time the 
doctor inflated the catheter it ruptured.75 The plaintiff then “developed a 
heart block,” requiring emergency surgery.76 The plaintiff sued in the 
Northern District of New York, alleging design, warning, and 
manufacturing defects under negligence, strict liability in tort, and 
implied warranty of merchantability theories.77 
Medtronic asserted that the plaintiff’s design, warning, and 
manufacturing claims were preempted by the MDA, and the district court 
agreed, dismissing the claims.78 The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff’s claims “would, if 
  
 65 Id. at 1015 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-853, at 8 (1976)) (quotation marks omitted). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 1015 n.6 (citing R. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON 
SHIELD BANKRUPTCY 23 (1991)). 
 68 Id. at 1003. 
 69 Id. at 1004 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1)(A) (2006)). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 1005. By the time the Supreme Court addressed the case Charles Riegel had 
died, and his widow Donna Riegel was petitioner “on her own behalf and as administrator of her 
husband’s estate.” Id. at 1006 n.3.  
 73 Id. at 1005. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 1005-06. 
 78 Id. The district court held that the MDA did not preempt claims based on violation of 
federal law. Id. at 1006. The district court also found the MDA preempted the loss of consortium 
claim brought by Donna Riegel, Charles’ widow, “to the extent it was derivative of the pre-empted 
claims.” Id. 
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successful, impose state requirements that differed from, or added to” the 
requirements of the MDA.79 
The Supreme Court also affirmed in an 8-1 decision authored by 
Justice Scalia. Justice Stevens joined the decision except for Parts III-A 
and III-B, and Justice Ginsburg dissented. Justice Scalia noted that the 
MDA includes an express preemption clause at 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).80 It 
states that: 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political 
subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a 
device intended for human use any requirement— 
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under 
this chapter to the device, and  
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other 
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.81 
Justice Scalia portrayed the case as presenting two questions. 
The first was “whether the Federal Government ha[d] established 
requirements applicable to Medtronic’s catheter.”82 In addressing this 
question Justice Scalia contrasted Riegel’s facts with the facts of Lohr,83 
the previously mentioned 1996 Supreme Court case that addressed 
whether federal manufacturing and labeling requirements applicable to 
medical devices generally preempted common law claims of negligence 
and strict liability.84 In Lohr, the Court rejected finding preemption based 
on broad federal labeling requirements applicable to medical devices that 
reflected “entirely generic concerns about device regulation generally.”85 
Justice Scalia emphasized that Riegel, unlike Lohr, involved a 
federal requirement that is “specific to individual devices.”86 Under 
Riegel’s facts, each and every medical device that is not substantially 
equivalent to existing devices must undergo the federal premarket 
approval process. The MDA, rather than exempting federal safety 
review, “is federal safety review.”87 Thus, Justice Scalia concluded that 
the federal government has established requirements applicable to 
Medtronic’s catheter.88 
Justice Scalia presented the second question in Riegel as whether 
the plaintiff’s claims rely on any “requirement” of New York law that is 
  
 79 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 80 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1003. 
 81 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). 
 82 Riegel, 128. S. Ct. at 1006. 
 83 518 U.S. 470 (1996).  
 84 Riegel, 128. S. Ct. at 1006; see supra text accompanying notes 52-54. 
 85 Lohr, 518 U.S. at 501. 
 86 Riegel, 128. S. Ct. at 1007. 
 87 Id. 
 88 See id. 
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different from or in addition to federal requirements.89 He again cited 
Lohr for guidance, noting that in that case five Justices held that state 
negligence and strict liability causes of action constitute 
“‘requirement[s]’ and would be preempted by federal requirements 
specific to a medical device.”90 Justice Scalia asserted that under normal 
circumstances “‘requirements’ include [state] common-law duties.”91 
Further, under Riegel’s facts, “there is nothing to contradict this normal 
meaning.”92 This is because “[s]tate tort law that requires a 
manufacturer’s catheters to be safer, but hence less effective, than the 
model the FDA has approved disrupts the federal scheme no less than 
state regulatory law to the same effect.”93 
The tone of Justice Scalia’s analysis suggests that skepticism 
regarding American tort law may be an important factor in preemption’s 
rise. Indeed, the decision is surprisingly derisive regarding the tort 
system in products liability cases. Perhaps even more surprisingly, the 
majority opinion may reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of 
important aspects of products liability law.  
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion argues that tort liability under 
negligence or strict liability is “less deserving of preservation” in the 
presence of federal regulation than are state statutes or state regulations.94 
He views state statutes or regulations related to prescription products as 
at least similar to FDA regulations, in that they can “be expected to apply 
cost-benefit analysis similar to that applied by the experts at the FDA.”95 
In Justice Scalia’s view, this cost-benefit analysis by state regulators and 
FDA regulators asks: “How many more lives will be saved by a device 
which, along with its greater effectiveness, brings a greater risk of 
harm?”96 
Juries in torts cases, Justice Scalia seemingly asserts, are simply 
not to be trusted to balance these interests. In what appears to represent a 
significant misunderstanding of design defect analysis, he insists that “[a] 
jury . . . sees only the cost of a more dangerous design, and is not 
concerned with its benefits; the patients who reaped those benefits are 
not represented in court.”97  
Apparently Justice Scalia is not familiar with the Restatement 
(Third)’s design defect standard nor the numerous decisions by state 
courts setting forth a risk/utility test for liability.98 Under this dominant 
  
 89 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006)). 
 90 Id.  
 91 Id. at 1008. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id.  
 94 See id.  
 95 Id.  
 96 Id.  
 97 Id.  
 98 According to the Restatement (Third), a product  
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approach to design defects, jurors are of course instructed to consider a 
design’s benefits as well as its risks.99 True, the patients who reaped a 
design’s benefits are not themselves represented in court, but the 
defendant-seller most certainly is, and it will communicate as much as 
possible to the jury about these patients’ reaping benefits (at least in 
general terms). In addition to minimizing the design’s risks (often in 
comparison to what the plaintiff asserts is a reasonable alternative 
design),100 the defendant manufacturer or other seller of course focuses 
on evidence highlighting the design’s benefits and, at least in general 
terms, its ability to achieve good results for other patients.  
Even if a court rejects the risk/utility approach in favor of its 
most common alternative, the reasonable consumer expectations test,101 
the product’s benefits as well as its risks are relevant to a jury’s analysis 
of reasonable expectations.102 Consumers might expect that 
  
is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have 
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller 
or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the 
omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998). For example, Arizona has adopted a 
risk-utility test, rather than a consumer expectations test, for its design defect cases, since 
“consumers will very often not know what to expect of a complex or unfamiliar design.” Id. at cmt. 
d, Reporters’ Notes, at 66 (citing Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., 709 P.2d 876, 878 (Ariz. 1985)). A risk-utility 
test is also used in Maine design defect cases—according to the Maine Supreme Court, “To 
determine whether a product is defectively dangerous, we balance the danger presented by the 
product against its utility.” Id. at 70. (citing Guiggey v. Bombardier, 615 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Me. 
1992)). In addition, both New Hampshire, as outlined in Thibauld v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 
843 (N.H. 1978), and New Mexico, as indicated in Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54 
(N.M. 1995), use a risk-utility analysis to determine design defect. Id.  
 99 The Restatement (Third) notes that some form of risk-utility balancing typically 
requiring evidence of a reasonable alternative design in design defect cases is followed by “the 
overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. 
§ 2(b), cmt. d Reporters’ Note (1998). For example, South Carolina’s risk-utility balancing test 
includes the following factors: “[T]he usefulness and desirability of the product, the cost involved 
for added safety, the likelihood and potential seriousness of injury, and the obviousness of danger.” 
Claytor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (S.C. 1982)).  
 100 See, e.g., Green v. Denney, 742 P.2d 639, 640-41 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (Defendant car 
manufacturer, in response to plaintiff’s claim of defective car roof design and suggestion of a 
superior alternative design, downplayed the true risk of the type of injury that occurred in this case, 
in which a passenger was killed when the car struck a horse, causing the horse to land on the roof 
and the roof to crush the victim.).  
 101 The states’ use of these two tests has evolved significantly since the Restatement 
(Second)’s product liability standards were created. Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Product 
Liability, 26 REV. LITIG. 1067, 1079 (2007). Although most states initially adopted the consumer 
expectations test, which was outlined in comment i of the Restatement (Second) section 402A, 
certain problems arose as courts attempted to use this test exclusively. Id. Accordingly, some courts 
followed the lead of the California Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Engineering Company, Inc., 573 
P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978), establishing a two-prong test for defective product design: consumer 
expectations and risk-utility. Wright, supra, at 1079-80. Note, however, that many courts continue to 
employ a consumer expectations test alone. Id. at 1080.  
 102 Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1781 
(2003) (“The expectations of consumers are most helpful in product design litigation when they 
capture lay values that do not appear in the comparatively narrow risk-utility test. Technical analysis 
of product risks and benefits remains necessary, however, to ensure that product manufacturers face 
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manufacturers would market a product that features high risk if the 
product also offers correspondingly high benefits, thus making the 
dangerous product arguably non-defective under a consumer 
expectations analysis. Arguing, as did Justice Scalia, that a jury is “not 
concerned with [a design’s] benefits” is only tenable if one assumes that 
juries completely disregard the defendant’s evidence and arguments.103 
Judging from manufacturers’ frequent success in products liability 
litigation, this is simply not accurate.104 Jurors in products liability cases 
as a matter of course consider designs’ benefits, and very frequently they 
find that because of those benefits an injured plaintiff must lose.105 
Another potential signal that perhaps drug regulation and tort 
law were not considered carefully enough is found in Justice Scalia’s 
somewhat dramatic pronouncement that the cost-benefit analysis used by 
FDA and by state drug regulators focuses on “how many more lives will 
be saved by a device which . . . brings a greater risk of harm.”106 In 
reality, many Class III medical devices have nothing to do with saving 
lives. Class III medical devices, subject to MDA regulation, entail a wide 
range of utilities and purposes. Breast implants, to pick an easy example, 
are Class III medical devices but are rarely thought of as saving lives.107 
Some Class III medical devices save lives, but many or perhaps most 
have an honorable but less compelling use. Stating the cost-benefit 
analysis as one of “saving lives” is at best loose language and seems to 
equate Class III regulation with life or death matters across the board, 
thus making potential interference by the tort system seem to risk life or 
death across the board. Tort law that regulates a matter of life or death 
seems more grave than tort law that plays a role in regulation that is 
  
appropriate safety incentives whenever consumer expectations, for whatever reason, are lower than 
the level of safety that a risk-utility test would deem reasonable.”). 
 103  Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008). 
 104 According to the Department of Justice, “[n]on-asbestos product liability trials 
declined by about two-thirds from 1990 to 2003.” OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
NUMBER OF FEDERAL TORT TRIALS FELL BY ALMOST 80 PERCENT FROM 1985 THROUGH 2003 
(2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/fttv03pr.htm. During the fiscal year 
2002-2003, the Justice Department found that (1) juries heard just over 70% of the products liability 
cases decided in federal court, and (2) there was a judgment for the plaintiff in just one-third of all 
federal products liability cases. Id. The Justice Department has also recently studied civil trial 
statistics in state courts. In state court civil trials during 2005, plaintiffs won a very low percentage 
(20%) of product liability trials that did not involve asbestos, despite winning more than half (56%) 
of the total number of state court civil cases, and more than half (52%) of the total number of tort 
cases, during this time period. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: 
CIVIL BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf. Over 92% of the non-asbestos products liability 
cases heard in state courts during this time were decided by a jury. Id. at 2.  
 105 See supra note 104. 
 106 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008. 
 107 Even though breast implants are not considered to save lives, they fall under the Class 
III devices category because they present a “potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.” Mark 
C. Levy & Gregory J. Wartman, Amicus Curiae Efforts to Reform Product Liability at the Food and 
Drug Administration: FDA’s Influence on Federal Preemption of Class III Medical Devices and 
Pharmaceuticals, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 495, 498 (2005) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360(a)(1)(C)). 
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sometimes a matter of life or death, sometimes a matter of cosmetics, and 
probably most often somewhere between those two extremes. 
The Riegel majority concluded that state tort lawsuits are only 
preempted “to the extent that they are different from, or in addition to” 
federal requirements.108 Under this reading, the court, again citing Lohr, 
held that damages remedies are not preempted if they run “parallel” to 
federal requirements rather than adding to them.109 A claim would 
parallel the MDA regulations if the defendant’s medical product ran 
afoul of both the MDA and state tort law.  
Justice Stevens concurred in part and concurred with the 
judgment. He disagreed with the majority’s assertion that Congress 
decided when enacting the MDA that costs of injuries caused by medical 
devices falling within the Act’s scope would be outweighed by concern 
that some medical devices would not be available if juries were 
permitted to apply the tort law of all fifty states.110 To the contrary, 
Justice Stevens asserted that “[t]here is nothing in the preenactment 
history of the MDA suggesting that Congress thought state tort remedies 
had impeded the development of medical devices.”111 He agreed with 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent that “the overriding purpose of the legislation 
was to provide additional protection to consumers, not to withdraw 
existing protections.”112 However, despite his disagreement over 
Congress’ intent in enacting the MDA, Justice Stevens agreed with the 
majority that the plaintiff’s tort claims must be preempted. Regardless of 
Congress’ intent when the MDA became law, Justice Stevens believed 
that allowing plaintiffs’ tort claims would “constitute requirements with 
respect to the device at issue that differ from federal requirements 
relating to safety and effectiveness.”113 
Justice Ginsburg provided the sole dissent. In doing so she 
focused heavily on the history and background of the MDA. She 
described the majority’s position as a “radical curtailment” of tort claims 
that was not intended by Congress when it enacted the MDA.114 In Justice 
Ginsburg view, the reason Congress enacted the MDA “is evident.”115 As 
addressed above, prior to 1976 the federal government did not regulate 
medical devices before they entered the market.116 However, the Dalkon 
Shield tragedy and other problems with prescription devices created 
political pressure for some form of regulation.117 Several “states acted to 
  
 108 Riegel, 128. S. Ct. at 1011. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 1012 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 1012-13. 
 114 Id. at 1013 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id.; see supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text. 
 117 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1014-15. 
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fill the void by adopting their own regulatory systems for medical 
devices.”118 By the time of the MDA’s enactment in 1976, thirteen states 
had already created statutes governing medical devices.119 Needing to 
comply with these states’ explicit regulations as well as the federal 
government’s new regulations in 1976 was considered overly 
burdensome to prescription product manufacturers. Thus, Justice 
Ginsburg explained, the MDA’s preemption clause was drafted to 
eliminate these state regulatory systems rather than to preempt state tort 
claims.120 Since Congress’ intent is the “ultimate touchstone” of 
preemption analysis, Justice Ginsburg could not agree with the 
majority’s decision.121 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent briefly noted a point widely discussed 
among scholars and in the media: that during the litigation, the FDA 
announced a new position favoring preemption in premarket approval 
MDA claims.122 Justice Ginsburg emphasized that previously, under the 
Clinton administration, the FDA had taken the position that “FDA 
product approval and state tort liability usually operate independently, 
each providing a significant, yet distinct, layer of consumer 
protection.”123 She asserted that inconsistency in an agency’s position 
regarding whether preemption should apply is a factor to consider in 
deciding how much weight the agency’s position is due and summarily 
rejected the FDA’s new pro-preemption position as “entitled to little 
weight.”124 
In late 2008, after Riegel had been decided and shortly before the 
Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the later preemption case of 
Levine v. Wyeth, controversy related to the FDA’s shift in position made 
headlines. On October 29th, United States House of Representatives 
member Henry Waxman released documents detailing a rift in the FDA’s 
management between top staff regulators and Bush administration 
political appointees regarding whether to shift the FDA’s position on 
preemption.125 
During his administration, President George W. Bush expressed 
concerns regarding tort liability for prescription products.126 Perhaps not 
  
 118 Id. at 1013. 
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surprisingly, he appointed officials who favored expanding preemption 
to limit tort liability for prescription products.127 According to the 
documents released by Representative Waxman, the struggle between the 
Bush administration and senior FDA staff members developed early in 
the Bush administration.128 Critics of the FDA’s shift in position to 
support preemption hailed the Waxman report as evidence that the Bush 
administration was playing politics with the FDA rather than acting in 
the best interests of consumers. One consumer activist described the 
documents as showing “that the nonpolitical people—the actual experts 
in the drug-approval process—didn’t agree with the approach of 
deferring to the companies.”129 
Another interesting sidebar to Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is her 
emphasis that the majority decision does not address an “important 
issue” whether the MDA’s express preemption language preempts tort 
lawsuits “where evidence of a medical device’s defect comes to light 
only after the device receives premarket approval.”130 Assuming that a 
defect for which the manufacturer is responsible exists, finding no 
preemption in such cases may be consistent with the reasoning of 
Riegel’s majority opinion; in such cases the FDA has not made a fully 
informed decision that a product’s benefits as marketed outweigh its 
costs. 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent addresses at least two additional 
matters of interest. First, she noted that the FDA’s premarket approval of 
Medtronic’s medical device would remain relevant even under her 
position.131 Although she would have rejected express preemption under 
section 360k(a), implied conflict preemption would still remain a 
possibility in appropriate cases. Thus, “a medical device manufacturer 
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may have a dispositive defense if it can identify an actual conflict 
between the plaintiff’s theory of the case and the FDA’s premarket 
approval of the device in question.”132 Justice Ginsburg noted that 
Medtronic did not argue implied conflict preemption in this case.133 
Second, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that medical device 
manufacturers also can make regulatory compliance defenses based on 
the FDA’s premarket approval of their product.134 Although in most 
states the fact that a manufacturer has complied with regulations does not 
automatically clear him or her of liability, it is nevertheless “regarded as 
one factor to be considered by the jury.”135 
Near the end of her dissent, Justice Ginsburg indicated that she 
found Medtronic’s preemption argument wanting on policy grounds in 
addition to grounds of conflicting with congressional intent. Although 
Medtronic’s product underwent a premarket approval process, “the 
process for approving new drugs is at least as rigorous as the premarket 
approval process for medical devices.”136 However, “[c]ourts that have 
considered the question have overwhelmingly held that FDA approval of 
a new drug application does not preempt state tort law suits.”137 If 
rigorous premarket approval for prescription drugs does not preempt tort 
claims, Justice Ginsburg reasoned, on policy grounds neither should 
premarket approval for prescription medical devices.138 She noted: “This 
court will soon address the issue in Levine v. Wyeth.”139 
B.  Levine v. Wyeth—Seeking to Extend Preemption to Drug 
Failure to Warn Claims 
The second prescription product case considered by the Supreme 
Court in 2008—and decided in 2009—featured even higher stakes for the 
future of tort liability for prescription products. In Levine v. Wyeth, 
plaintiff Diana Levine sued over harm related to defendant Wyeth’s drug 
Phenageran.140 In April 2000, Levine went to the Northeast Washington 
County Community Health, Inc. in Vermont complaining of nausea 
related to a migraine headache.141 To treat the nausea she was given two 
injections of Phenageran.142 The first injection was given 
intramuscularly.143 However, because the nausea continued, later in the 
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day she was given another injection by an intravenous injection directly 
into her arm.144 The intravenous injection was performed through a 
procedure called “IV push,”145 during which the Phenageran was 
accidentally injected into one of Levine’s arteries.146 This caused severe 
damage to the artery, leading to gangrene and eventually to amputation 
of Levine’s hand and forearm.147 Levine sued Wyeth for failure to 
provide adequate warnings related to accidental intra-arterial injections 
with Phenageran.148 Levine’s attorneys argued that Wyeth should have 
warned against ever injecting the drug.149 
Wyeth’s label for Phenageran did provide warnings for health 
care providers about the dangers of inadvertent intra-arterial injection.150 
The warnings stated that “extreme care should be exercised to avoid 
perivascular extravasation or inadvertent intra-arterial injection.”151 The 
label also stated that “[w]hen administering any irritant drug 
intravenously it is usually preferable to inject it through the tubing of an 
intravenous infusion set that is known to be functioning satisfactorily.”152 
The FDA had approved this warning used by Wyeth.153 Levine 
argued that “the label should not have allowed IV push as a means of 
administration, as it was safer to use other available options, such as 
intramuscular injection or administration through the tubing of a hanging 
IV bag.”154 The trial court instructed jurors that they could consider the 
label’s compliance with FDA requirements, but that regulatory 
compliance was not dispositive as a defense.155 The jury found for 
Levine, awarding her $7.4 million in compensatory damages.156 The 
Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict,157 and Wyeth appealed 
to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. 
1. Wyeth in the Vermont Supreme Court 
The Vermont Supreme Court’s decision in Wyeth set forth many 
of the issues to be considered by the United States Supreme Court. 
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Wyeth argued to the Vermont Supreme Court that “any state common 
law duty to provide a stronger warning about the dangers of 
administering Phenergan by IV push conflicts with the FDA’s approval 
of the drug’s label.”158 Thus, Wyeth argued, preemption should disallow 
Levine’s tort claims. Wyeth conceded that Congress did not expressly 
preempt claims such as Levine’s in the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, 
and instead asserted implied preemption.159 According to Wyeth, it was 
impossible to comply both with federal requirements and the regulation 
of Vermont tort law.160 Wyeth alternatively argued that Levine’s tort 
claim presented an obstacle to compliance with federal regulations by 
penalizing drug companies for compliance with FDA standards.161  
In rejecting these arguments, the Vermont Supreme Court 
summarized its position with the familiar refrain that the FDA’s 
requirements create “a floor, not a ceiling, for state regulation.”162 The 
court focused its analysis on the existence of “[a] key FDA regulation” 
that permits drug manufacturers to alter their labeling without prior 
approval by the FDA when necessary.163 The regulation, found at 21 
C.F.R. § 314.70(c), allows manufacturers, among other things, “[t]o add 
or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse 
reaction” and to “add or strengthen an instruction about dosage and 
administration that is intended to increase the safe use of the drug 
product.”164 The court held that this regulation not only permits, but also 
“arguably encourages” manufacturers to add warnings when the FDA 
warnings are not enough to provide adequate safety.165 Tort lawsuits 
“simply give these manufacturers a concrete incentive to take this action 
as quickly as possible.”166 
2. Wyeth in the United States Supreme Court  
After being granted certiorari by the United States Supreme 
Court, Wyeth garnered significant media attention.167 It was perceived as 
potentially becoming an extremely important case, in that it offered the 
possibility of a broad preemption ruling that could virtually destroy 
prescription product warning litigation. In analyzing the case before oral 
arguments were heard by the Supreme Court, Professors Anthony Sebok 
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and Benjamin Zipursky opined that “it is no exaggeration to say that the 
case presents the Roberts Court with the opportunity to eliminate most of 
pharmaceutical liability under state tort law in one fell swoop, if it so 
chooses.”168  
Both consumer groups and drug industry supporters seemed to 
agree, as numerous amicus briefs were filed on both sides of the issue.169 
In July 2008, the New England Journal of Medicine published an 
editorial warning that drug companies “could effectively be immunized” 
from tort lawsuits involving warnings approved by the FDA if the court 
ruled for the manufacturer.170 Praising the impact of products liability 
litigation on drug safety, the editorial argued that “[p]reemption will thus 
result in drugs and devices that are less safe and will thereby undermine 
a national effort to improve patient safety.”171 The editorial urged 
Congress to legislatively reverse Riegel and to consider doing the same 
with Wyeth if the Court chose to apply preemption to that case.172 
Numerous other editorials and op-ed articles appeared in other 
publications both supporting and opposing the possibility of a broad 
preemption ruling in Wyeth.173 As noted above, Representative 
Waxman’s report on the conflict between the Bush administration and 
FDA staff members regarding preemption made headlines shortly before 
the Court heard oral arguments.174 By the time the Court heard oral 
arguments, Wyeth had become “the highest profile business case of the 
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year”175 and one of the most intensely debated cases related to products 
liability in many years. The National Chamber of Commerce described 
it, perhaps a bit too breathlessly, as “the business case of the century.”176 
Reactions to oral arguments on November 3, 2008, were mixed, 
although the Justices’ questions and comments seemed to lower many 
observers’ expectations regarding a potentially sweeping decision that 
might virtually eliminate prescription product warnings defect litigation. 
The Los Angeles Times reported that “the justices appeared to be closely 
split” on whether to follow the Bush administration’s approach to 
preemption.177 The Houston Chronicle was less equivocal, with the 
headline of its article covering the oral argument reading in part: 
“Justices appear poised to side with drugmakers.”178 The New York Times 
reported that what “was supposed to be the term’s blockbuster business 
case . . . quickly turned into a search for limiting principles.”179 Although 
several of the Justices asked questions or made comments that may have 
reflected openness to some form of preemption in warning cases 
involving FDA approval, several of them also may have hinted at an 
interest in restricting preemption in some cases involving FDA-approved 
labels; for example, cases in which drug companies learn of new risks 
after the FDA has approved their labeling.180 Many of the Justices’ 
questions, particularly those directed at the plaintiff’s counsel, seemed to 
focus on when a risk is “new,” and on which party might have the burden 
of persuasion that a risk was discovered after FDA approval.181  
When the Supreme Court delivered its decision in Wyeth in 
March 2009, many were surprised. In a six-to-three decision the court 
held that Levine’s claims against Wyeth were not preempted by the 
FDA’s approval of Phenergan’s warning label. The New York Times 
described this ruling as “a major setback for business groups that had 
hoped to build a barrier against injury lawsuits seeking billions of 
dollars.”182 
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In its decision, the Court rejected Wyeth’s impossibility defense 
and its argument that failing to find preemption would obstruct the 
purposes and objectives of FDA regulations. Regarding impossibility, the 
Court held that FDA regulations allow manufacturers to add to or 
strengthen warnings based on “newly acquired information,” and that 
newly acquired information may include new analyses of previously 
submitted data.183 In this case, the Court held that the plaintiff had 
provided evidence “of at least 20 incidents prior to her injury in which a 
Phenergan injection resulted in gangrene and an amputation,”184 and that 
on the basis of this information Wyeth could have added a stronger 
warning regarding use of the IV-push method.185 Noting that 
“impossibility pre-emption is a demanding defense,” the Court found 
Wyeth’s argument for it lacking.186  
Regarding Wyeth’s argument that allowing liability would 
obstruct the FDA regulatory scheme’s purposes and objectives, the Court 
agreed with the Vermont Supreme Court that FDA requirements provide 
merely a floor for drug regulation, rather than “both a floor and a ceiling” 
as contended by Wyeth.187 State tort lawsuits, the Court held, are an 
important aspect of drug regulation that builds up from the floor of FDA 
requirements.188 The Court emphasized that the FDA has only limited 
resources to monitor the thousands of drugs on the market, and that the 
tort system may be especially helpful in regulating new risks that may 
emerge in drugs’ postmarketing phase.189 The Court also found it 
significant that Congress had never chosen to insert an express 
preemption provision into the Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act in its 
seventy-year history; if Congress thought state tort claims interfered with 
its objectives, the Court reasoned that Congress would have at some 
point enacted an express preemption provision.190 
Significantly, the Court found that the FDA’s 2006 preamble 
supporting preemption “does not merit deference.”191 In language that 
may reflect consciousness of the political controversy surrounding the 
FDA’s new pro-preemption stance under the George W. Bush 
administration, the Court described the FDA’s 2006 preamble as 
“inherently suspect.”192 This is because the FDA articulated a new 
“sweeping position” in the preamble without offering states or other 
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interested parties notice or opportunity to comment.193 Further, the Court 
found the preamble “at odds” with other evidence of Congress’ purposes, 
criticizing it for failing to provide any discussion of how state tort law 
has interfered with Congress’ purposes.194 The Court also found the 
George W. Bush administration’s amicus brief “similarly undeserving of 
deference,” because its “explanation of federal drug regulation departs 
markedly from the FDA’s understanding at all times relevant to this 
case.”195 
Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion seeking to 
emphasize that state tort law sometimes is an obstacle to the FDA’s 
objectives, and thus may be in some instances preempted, but that 
preemption is not applicable to this case.196 Justice Thomas also wrote a 
separate concurring opinion to express that he has become “increasingly 
skeptical” of the Court’s “‘purposes and objectives’ preemption 
jurisprudence,” and that he cannot join the majority’s “implicit 
endorsement of far-reaching implied preemption doctrines.”197 
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts, 
dissented. The dissent argued that the majority’s decision was 
inconsistent with prior preemption decisions, and that in its decision the 
majority effectively allows state tort juries to countermand considered 
decisions by the FDA.198 The dissent expressed concern that this “has 
potentially far-reaching consequences.”199  
An especially interesting aspect of the dissent is its repetition of 
Justice Scalia’s attack on the civil jury system in drug cases set forth in 
Riegel.200 Justice Alito argued that “[b]y their very nature, juries are ill-
equipped to perform the FDA’s cost-benefit-balancing function.” This is 
because, according to the dissenters, juries only see the injured plaintiff 
and do not see the patients who reaped the benefits of a drug. As noted 
above, this criticism seems to reflect misunderstanding of what 
information juries consider in prescription drug litigation.201 Further, drug 
cases are not unique with respect to jurors only seeing the injured party 
and not seeing those who benefited from a products design or warning. 
Rather, this would be typical in all forms of product liability litigation 
based on design or warning defect claims where the defendant 
manufacturer argues that other consumers were benefited by the design 
or warning chosen. Only the injured plaintiff is before the jury’s eyes, 
and the defendant is permitted to present evidence to the jury of the 
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design or warning’s benefits to other consumers even though those 
consumers are not present in the courtroom. Casting out prescription 
product litigation on this basis as being ill-suited to determination by 
juries would seemingly implicate most other types of design or warning 
litigation.  
C.  Altria Group, Inc. v. Good—If at First You Don’t Preempt, Try, 
Try Again 
A third products liability preemption case analyzed by the 
Supreme Court between early 2008 and early 2009 was Altria Group, 
Inc. v. Good.202 Although Altria did not involve prescription products, it 
merits a brief discussion in this analysis. Altria involved an assertion by 
a cigarette manufacturer that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act preempted a lawsuit based on state unfair practices 
statute.203 The lawsuit centered on allegations that the defendant engaged 
in fraud (which allegedly violated the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act) 
by conveying the message that its “light” cigarettes “deliver less tar and 
nicotine to consumers.”204 In reality, the lawsuit alleged, the cigarette 
company knew that “[b]y covering filter ventilation holes with their lips 
or fingers, taking larger or more frequent puffs, and holding the smoke in 
their lungs for a longer period of time, smokers of ‘light’ cigarettes 
unknowingly inhale as much tar and nicotine as do smokers of regular 
cigarettes.”205 
The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 
“establish[ed] a comprehensive federal program to deal with cigarette 
labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between 
smoking and health.”206 A narrow five-to-four majority held that the state 
law claim was not expressly preempted because a state-imposed duty not 
to engage in fraud “has nothing to do with smoking and health.”207 
Rather, it has to do with not engaging in fraud. 
The majority relied heavily on Cipollone, the 1992 cigarette 
warning case that arguably started the Court’s evolution toward 
increased preemption in products liability claims.208 As noted above, 
Cipollone held that the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 
expressly preempted failure to warn tort claims.209 However, a plurality 
in Cipollone declined to preempt fraud claims under the Act, holding that 
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fraud claims “rely only on a single, uniform standard: falsity.”210 Such 
fraud claims, the Cipollone plurality held, are not “based on” smoking 
and health.211 The majority in Altria agreed with this holding in 
addressing the fraud-related claim before it.  
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Altria for our purposes is 
how close it came to cutting off many fraud-related claims against 
cigarette manufacturers. Four Justices—Justice Alito, Chief Justice 
Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas (the dissent’s author) —
dissented from the majority’s holding, and would have preempted the 
fraud-related claim. Expressly disagreeing with the plurality in 
Cipollone, the dissenters argued that the majority’s decision in Altria 
“will thus result in a ‘requirement’ that petitioners represent the effects 
of smoking on health in a particular way in their advertising and 
promotion of light cigarettes.”212 This position, which would have 
provided yet another significant expansion of preemption’s scope in 
cigarette litigation, came within one vote of prevailing.  
IV.  CONCLUSION: HEARING THE TUNE IF NOT THE WORDS: THE 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)’S PRESCRIPTION PRODUCT STANDARD 
AND COURTS’ TREND TOWARD RESTRICTIVENESS 
As noted above in Part II, the Restatement (Third)’s prescription 
product design standard set forth in section 6(c)—the no-reasonable-
health-care-provider-would-prescribe-to-any-class-of-patients test—has 
not experienced great success on its own terms. The standard did not 
have strong support in case law when it was adopted,213 and relatively 
few appellate courts have expressly applied the standard in the years that 
have followed the Restatement (Third)’s completion.214 Further, much, 
although not all, of the scholarly commentary addressing the standard 
has been critical.215 
However, if one looks from a wider angle at the tone of section 
6(c) and its comments and Reporters’ notes, more grounds for optimism 
arise in assessing its general consistency with judicial trends. Section 
6(c)’s restrictive tone may have to some extent caught the broad mood of 
courts in assessing prescription product design liability, even if the 
specific details of the unfamiliar standard have not found much traction.  
From this broad perspective, section 6(c)’s near-immunity 
standard is one of the most dramatic examples of the Restatement 
(Third)’s generally conservative approach to products liability, and 
courts have on the whole become increasingly conservative regarding 
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products liability in general, and specifically regarding liability for 
prescription products. The Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.216 in 1993, and, even more 
importantly, the enthusiasm with which many state and federal courts 
embraced Daubert’s restrictive tone, provides a helpful illustration. 
Daubert was a products liability case; it involved expert testimony 
regarding Bendectin.217 As I noted in an earlier article, “[w]ithout 
products liability, there would have been no Daubert, and there may 
have been relatively little perceived need for a decision like Daubert.”218 
The Daubert decision, one of the most influential evidence cases of the 
twentieth century, was neither pro-plaintiff nor pro-defendant in its 
specific holding. However, the concerns with “junk science” that 
spawned the case were widely perceived as primarily problems with 
plaintiffs’ experts, and many products liability cases such as Bendectin 
litigation are particularly reliant upon experts. Thus, not surprisingly, 
Daubert’s application in federal and state courts is generally viewed as 
pro-defendant and anti-liability.  
Indeed, in practice Daubert’s evidentiary restrictions, when 
viewed broadly, may be thought of as a form of judicial tort reform.219 
Most courts’ and commentators’ general perception from at least the 
1990s to the present has seemed to be, on the whole, that torts and 
products liability needed to be reigned in, as is reflected in the 
Restatement (Third)’s leanings. By significantly increasing the cost of 
expert testimony to meet its reliability standards, Daubert and its 
progeny (particularly its progeny) made thousands of products liability 
cases much more expensive to litigate, thus rendering many medium-
value claims220 financially unviable for plaintiffs and their attorneys.221 
Preemption’s rise also reflects a judicial outlook that may be, on 
the whole, increasingly attracted to limiting products liability. Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc.,222 addressed at some length above,223 provides an 
illustration with prescription medical device design. Through its 
expansive preemption holding, the Supreme Court moved us closer to the 
Restatement (Third)’s goal of being quite restrictive in this area. 
  
 216 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 217 Id. at 582. 
 218 Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Believing in Products Liability: Reflections on Daubert, 
Doctrinal Evolution, and David Owen’s Products Liability Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 516 
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 220 Because of the expense of litigation, small products liability claims requiring expert 
testimony were, of course, already rare even before Daubert.  
 221 Cupp, supra note 218, at 528-29. Because of the expense of litigation, small products 
liability claims requiring expert testimony were, of course, already rare even before Daubert. 
 222 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). 
 223 See supra Part III.A. 
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Riegel specifically focused on prescription medical devices that 
have undergone premarket FDA approval.224 Although most new Class 
III devices do not undergo the premarket approval process (according to 
Riegel, only thirty-two out of 3,148 in 2005),225 the ruling eliminates 
lawsuits for a category of new medical devices that might most likely be 
the subject of litigation—since they are entirely new rather than 
“substantially equivalent” to already existing devices. Thus, Riegel will 
have a substantial restrictive effect on prescription product design defect 
claims. Particularly when one considers Justice Scalia’s derisive tone in 
addressing the jury system in prescription product claims (“A jury . . . 
sees only the cost of a more dangerous design, and is not concerned with 
its benefits; the patients who reaped those benefits are not represented in 
court”),226 it does not seem a stretch to speculate that the case’s expansive 
preemption ruling may have been influenced in part by a more general 
concern that products liability claims for prescription products need to be 
restricted as a matter of general public policy. Although it focuses on 
preemption rather than doctrinal limitations, Riegel presents a tone of 
restrictiveness consistent with the Restatement (Third)’s tone. 
Further, some of section 6(c)’s reasons for being restrictive 
overlap with some of the arguments for preemption in drug design cases. 
For example, in supporting the Restatement’s restrictive standard for 
prescription drug design, comment b notes that “[c]ourts have also 
recognized that the regulatory system governing prescription drugs is a 
legitimate mechanism for setting the standards for drug design.”227 The 
comment notes that this deference results in part from concerns over 
increased cost and decreased availability related to liability, and in part 
from assumptions that health care providers can ensure that “the right 
drugs and medical devices reach the right patients.”228 However, the 
comment also notes that the deference is based in part on an assumption 
“that governmental regulatory agencies adequately review new 
prescription drugs and devices, keeping unreasonably dangerous designs 
off the market.”229 Additionally, comment f asserts that section 6(c) 
“shows appropriate deference to the regulated market.”230 
The full impact of the Wyeth decision in 2009 will only be 
known over time. Professor Catherine Sharkey is probably correct in 
asserting that now, in light of Wyeth, “there is certainly a thumb on the 
scale against the more aggressive arguments for implied preemption.”231 
This seems especially true in light of Barak Obama’s election as 
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President in late 2008. President Obama seems unlikely to appoint 
Supreme Court justices that would empower the Wyeth dissenters 
(Justices Alito, Roberts, and Scalia) to effectively reverse the decision in 
the coming several years. Also important, President Obama seems 
unlikely to staff the FDA with officials who would equal the George W. 
Bush administration’s appointees in disdain for tort law involving 
prescription product warnings.  
Although Wyeth provides some boundaries for preemption’s 
growth, it is a case involving prescription product warning claims, not 
prescription product design claims. Riegel, decided only a short time 
before Wyeth, addressed prescription design claims in the context of 
prescription medical devices and applied preemption fairly 
aggressively.232  
Thus, perhaps, when viewed broadly, the Riegel and Wyeth 
preemption decisions may to some extent parallel the Restatement 
(Third)’s disdain for prescription product design liability but acceptance 
of prescription product warning liability. Maybe section 6(c) missed the 
song’s words but heard its tune when developing a standard with a tone 
of deference to federal regulation in prescription product design defect 
claims that is in line with courts’ evolution, even though the section’s 
explicit standard is not. Section 6(c) has increasingly seemed to capture 
courts’ general pulse on prescription design defects despite failing to 
attain traction with its doctrinal analysis.  
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